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Retrodirective-Assisted Secure Wireless
Key Establishment
Yuan Ding, Junqing Zhang, and Vincent F. Fusco, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract— In this paper, a new type of architecture for
secure wireless key establishment is proposed. A retrodirective
array (RDA) that is configured to receive and re-transmit at
different frequencies is utilized as a relay node. The RDA is
able to respond in “real time,” reducing the required number
of time slots to two. More importantly, in this architecture,
equivalent reciprocal wireless channels between legitimate keying
nodes can be randomly updated within one channel coherence
time period, leading to greatly increased key generation rates
in slow fading environment. The secrecy performance of this
RDA-assisted key generation system is evaluated under several
eavesdropping strategies and it is shown that it outperforms
previous relay key generation systems.
Index Terms— Retrodirective array, key generation, wireless
communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
MOBILE wireless communication has experienced anunprecedented growth in recent years presenting many
enterprise opportunities. Along with these opportunities there
are attendant risks. The broadcast nature of the electromag-
netic wave propagation medium in a wireless environment
significantly increases the chances of sensitive information
being intercepted by eavesdroppers. Currently sensitive trans-
mission data is encrypted at the upper protocol layers through
mathematical cryptographic means [1]. Recently the potential
for the efficacy of such mathematical encryption schemes
to be mitigated has been under discussion [2]. Furthermore,
requirements related to trusted key management infrastructure
may render conventional cryptographic method less applicable
for some wireless systems, such as ad-hoc networks and low-
cost wireless sensor networks [3], hence potentially providing
a systemic issue regarding ubiquitous rollout of the Internet
of Things [4].
Distinct from the upper layer cryptographic approach, phys-
ical layer security techniques do not reply on computational
complexity. This implies that the achieved level of security will
not be compromised even if an unauthorized third party has
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unlimited computational capability [5]. One form of physical
layer security techniques relies on the establishment of secret
keys by exploiting randomness of reciprocal propagation chan-
nels between keying nodes [6], [7]. The information theoretical
foundation of this key establishment approach was given
in [8] and [9].
Key generation normally consists of four steps: channel
probing, quantization, information reconciliation, and privacy
amplification [7]. Two legitimate users alternately measure the
signal waveforms transmitted through propagation channels
to harvest the randomness in channel probing stage. After
converting the channel measurements into binary bits in quan-
tization step, the mismatch bits of shared keys are corrected
in information reconciliation using protocols or error correc-
tion codes. Finally the leaked information on shared keys is
removed in privacy amplification step, e.g., through universal
hashing functions. In this paper, we focus on designing a
relay-based key generation architecture which enables a larger
amount of common information being shared among keying
nodes in wireless channel probing stage, when compared with
previous relay key generation schemes. The remaining key
generation procedures investigated previously, e.g., quantiza-
tion schemes in [10], information reconciliation in [11], and
privacy amplification in [12], can then be implemented after
the common signal waveforms have been obtained in the
channel probing stage.
There are several characteristics of legitimate channels that
can be utilized to extract secret keys, such as received signal
strength (RSS) [13]–[15], channel phase delays [16], [17],
multipath relative time delays [18], [19], and full channel
state information (CSI) [20], [21]. No matter which channel
parameters are chosen, there is always a trade-off between
key generation rate (KGR), describing the amount of key bits
generated per time unit, and key disagreement rate (KDR),
denoting bit disagreement rates of the generated keys shared
by legitimate nodes. In a slow fading channel, the channel
cross-correlation is impacted by the non-simultaneous probing
and independent noise at each keying node, which result in
the key disagreement [21], [22]. Therefore, the number of
key quantization levels should be kept small in order to get
a low KDR. On the other hand, slow fading channels and
low quantization levels limit achievable KGR, since the key
generation round can only be conducted once during one
channel coherence time period.
A number of approaches have been proposed to increase
KGR without degrading KDR. In [15], [23], and [24] multiple
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nodes or multiple antennas at each node are exploited in order
to create multiple usable common channels from which more
key bits can be extracted within one channel coherence time
period. Similarly, multiple independent or quasi-independent
channels can be generated using frequency resources, such
as channel hopping in [25]–[27], and OFDM signals in [21]
and [28]–[30]. A concept utilizing random beamforming was
proposed in [27], [31], and [32]. Here the excitation weights
of multi-antenna nodes are randomly updated during each key
generation round, such that a controlled artificial ‘fast fading’
channel is created. As a consequence, more independent
random secret key bits can be generated by repeated channel
probing within one channel coherence time period.
In addition to the above methods, helper or relay nodes
have been introduced in [17] and [33]–[37]. In [33] the
presence of a relay node helps create two more com-
mon channels that exist between each of the keying
nodes and the relay, such that KGR can be increased.
Apart from creating more usable channels, the relay
nodes can also help generate artificial noise [34], [35],
which contaminates the intercepted signals received by eaves-
droppers, or helps enhance the randomness of the channel
characteristics, [35]–[37], in such a fashion to increase secret
key rates. However, there are issues associated with the helper
or relay architectures, which are listed as follows:
a) the relay or helper needs to have calculation capa-
bilities, e.g., estimating channels in [33], generating
well designed artificial interference in [34], [35], and
demodulating signals in [37];
b) the relay or helper needs to be a trusted party [17], [34]–
[36], and in some cases a secure channel between helper
and one of the keying nodes is required [34];
c) the relay or helper has to acquire some system knowl-
edge before carrying out key generation protocols. This
includes time-slot assignment [17], [33]–[37], CSI of
legitimate channels [17], and the training symbols used
in the system [33], [35], [36];
d) only one probing of the channel can be performed per
coherence time period [17], [33]–[37].
These factors make the above mentioned relay key generation
architectures unsuitable in many application scenarios.
In this paper we propose a new type of relay key generation
architecture, which uses a retrodirective array (RDA) [38] as
a relay node. By configuring the RDA node to receive and
re-transmit at different frequencies, the common waveform
observations can be shared among legitimate users for further
secret key extraction. This arrangement has the following
characteristics that facilitate overcoming the above mentioned
weaknesses;
a) the RDA relay node can be implemented in an analogue
fashion thereby allowing low power consumption and
the real-time response. The RDA node does not need to
have any additional digital calculation capabilities;
b) no secure links between RDA and other keying nodes
are required. Since the RDA can operate without demod-
ulating signals nor estimating channels, the potential
for the relay node to leak information intentionally or
unintentionally is significantly reduced, i.e., it can be
considered as a trusted node;
b) no system parameters including CSI, training sequences,
and time-slot assignment are required by the RDA relay
node;
d) multiple channel measurements can be conducted within
one coherence time period, because with the help of the
RDA the equivalent channel can be manipulated to be
‘fast fading’, greatly increasing the achievable KGR.
Besides the above listed characteristics, the proposed archi-
tecture requires only two time slots for each key generation
round, compared with at least three time slots in previous relay
key generation protocols.
We need to point out that the approaches presented
in [21]–[32], i.e., multi-antenna, multi-carrier, and ramdom
beamforming schemes, can also be applied onto the RDA key
generation architecture proposed in this paper, leading to a
further increased KGR. The combinations of these techniques
with the methodology suggested here are not discussed in this
paper.
This paper is organized as follows;
• In Section II, system models including statistical multi-
path channels and RDAs used throughout the paper are
described.
• In Section III, the single antenna element RDA assisted
key generation architecture and the protocol deployed are
presented. In additional, various strategies with minimum
assumptions that can be adopted by eavesdroppers are
discussed.
• In Section IV, the secret key rates of the proposed
system are simulated and compared with non-relay and
previous relay key generation systems. It is shown
that the proposed RDA assisted key generation system
outperforms the previous relay key generation systems
under every eavesdropping scenarios, in terms of secrecy
performance.
• In Section V, from a more practical point of view the
impact of imperfect training sequence recovery at each
node on the system performance is investigated.
• In Section VI, the benefits of higher beamforming gains
towards legitimate nodes than those towards eavesdrop-
pers, which are brought by involving more antenna ele-
ments in RDA relay nodes, are briefly investigated.
• In Section VII, conclusions are drawn.
Throughout this paper, the following notations will be used:
Boldface lower case and capital letters, e.g., h and H, denote
parameters in time and frequency domains, respectively, and
they are complex numbers. Boldface capital letter with an
arrow on top refers to a vector, whose elements are parameters
in frequency domain. Letters with superscripts RD A, nr , and r
correspond to parameters in the proposed RDA, non-relay, and
previous relay key generation systems. ‘[·]∗’ denotes complex
conjugate operator, and ‘◦’ is the Hadamard product of two
vectors. ‘[x]+’ returns zero if x is less than zero otherwise
returns x .
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II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Statistical Multipath Channel Model
In this paper a dynamic multipath-rich Rayleigh wire-
less propagation channel is considered. The channel impulse
response (CIR) can be written as
h(τ, t) =
L−1∑
l=0
h(τl , t)δ(τ − τl), (1)
where h(τl , t) is a complex number representing the attenua-
tion and phase delay of the lth (l = 0, 1, ..., L−1) propagation
path, i.e., channel taps, between communication nodes at the
time instant t . τl refers to the time delay of the lth channel tap
relative to the corresponding t . δ(·) is the Dirac delta function.
It is assumed that, a) at each time instant the total number of
channel taps, i.e., L, is identical, b) τl starts from zero and is
uniformly spaced in time. Thus it can be expressed as τl = lT ,
where T is normally determined by the sampling period of
the hardware, c) the scattering multipath in the channel is
sufficiently rich that the h(τl , t) follows zero-mean complex
Gaussian distribution, i.e., h(τl , t) ∼ C N(0, σ 2hl ) [39].
When taking Fourier transform of (1) with respect to τ ,
the channel frequency response (CFR) can be obtained, and is
given as
H( f, t) =
L−1∑
l=0
h(τl , t)e− j2π f τl . (2)
Unless otherwise specified, all of the simulation results
presented in this paper are based on the following channel
parameters for typical wireless indoor environment [40].
• The sampling period T is set to 50 ns;
• The average power of each channel tap follows an expo-
nential decay power delay profile with root mean square
(RMS) delay spread στ of 50 ns, from which the number
of channel taps can be calculated to be 11;
• A bell-shaped Doppler power spectral density with
Doppler spread fd of 10 Hz is used.
The normalized auto-correlation function (ACF) of H( f, t)
can be formulated as [41]
rH ( f,t) = E
[
H∗ ( f, t) H ( f +  f, t + t)]
E
[
H∗ ( f, t) H ( f, t)] , (3)
where ‘E[·]’ is the expectation operator. From the ACF the
channel’s coherence bandwidth fc and coherence time Tc can
be calculated [42].
B. Retrodirective Arrays (RDAs)
Before describing the RDA relay key generation system in
Section III, RDA operation is briefly presented here. An RDA
has the capability to re-transmit a signal back along the spatial
direction(s), along which the array was illuminated by the
incoming signals without the need for a-priori knowledge of
their points of origin [38]. This automatic tracking characteris-
tic makes RDA technology useful in many mobile applications,
e.g., long-range radio frequency identification (RFID) [43]
and mobile satellite communications [44], [45]. The core
element of an RDA that enables the tracking functionality
Fig. 1. RDA operating principle.
is the phase conjugator unit [46]. Among many forms of
phase conjugator units, active analogue types are attractive
due to their low power consumption, real-time response, and
frequency reconfiguration flexibility [47], [48].
The basic operation upon which an RDA is predicated
is illustrated by way of an example shown in Fig. 1.
A distant source emits a pilot signal s(t), which can be a
radio frequency (RF) continuous wave (CW) or a modulated
signal waveform [49], at frequency fs . The detected signal
in the frequency domain at the mth (m = 1, 2, ..., M) RDA
element can be expressed as S( fs)H sm( fs), where the S( fs)
and Hsm( fs) are, respectively, the Fourier representations
of the pilot signal s(t) and the propagation channel hsm(t)
between the source and the mth RDA antenna element.
After the detected signal is processed through a phase con-
jugator, it becomes [S( fs)Hsm( fs)]∗. When re-transmitting
[S( fs)Hsm( fs)]∗ weighted local signal C at frequency fr by
the RDA, the received signal Y( fr ) at the source node can be
written as in (4),
Y( fr ) =
M∑
m=1
C[S( fs)Hsm( fs)]∗Gsm( fr ). (4)
A well-designed analogue RDA is able to complete the phase
conjugation operation within 100 μs, which is normally much
less than the channel coherence time Tc (usually in the order
of tens or hundreds of ms in indoor environment). Thus the
re-transmission channel Gsm( fr ) can be normally regarded to
be identical to the reception channel Hsm( fs) when fr = fs .
In this case (4) can, in the absence of noise, be expressed as
Y( fs) = CS∗( fs)
M∑
m=1
|Hsm( fs)|2 . (5)
Equation (5) indicates that the re-transmitted signals by each
RDA element are combined constructively both spatially and
temporally or, in other words, in-phase at the source node, i.e.,
automatically re-transmitting signal back to the source position
where the pilot signal is originated.
When fr = fs , as occurs in full-duplex RDAs, the re-
transmission channel Gsm( fr ) = Hsm( fs). In free space
Gsm( fr ) and Hsm( fs) can be directly linked by compensating
their frequency differences [50], thus after channel coefficient
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Fig. 2. Proposed RDA assisted wireless key generation system model.
calibration (5) still holds. The scenario of RDAs in multipath
channels when fr = fs is investigated in Section VI.
When an RDA is illuminated by multiple pilot sources from
different directions, as occurs in our proposed system archi-
tecture described in Section III, the signals are re-transmitted
along all of these directions with their beamforming gains
proportional to the magnitudes of the corresponding received
pilot signals along these directions [51]. This scenario is
essentially equivalent to the case of single pilot source in a
multipath environment.
III. RDA ASSISTED WIRELESS KEY GENERATION
In this section single antenna RDA assisted key generation
system is presented and the associated adversary model is
investigated. It should be noted that the single antenna RDA
is still able to phase conjugate the incoming signal, but cannot
perform beamforming for re-transmission towards the pilot
source. This architecture is further extended to the multi-
antenna RDA key generation system in Section VI with
additional benefits presented.
A. Single Antenna RDA Assisted Key Generation
The model of the proposed single antenna RDA assisted
key generation system is illustrated in Fig. 2. The nodes Alice
and Bob intend to establish a shared common key with the
help of a single antenna RDA node. These three nodes are
termed legitimate nodes hereafter. In this paper we assume
Alice and Bob are both equipped with a single antenna. Not
discussed in this paper are multiple-antenna cases which can
be investigated using similar methods to those in [23] and [52]
for MIMO key generation scenarios.
Each key generation round only comprises two time slots
(TS1, 2), which are now described;
TS1) Alice and Bob locally generate random and independent
signals Ui and Vi , respectively, and then radiate them
at an identical frequency f1. Here the subscript ‘i ’
refers to the i th key generation round. In order to
simplify notation, the subscript ‘i ’ is omitted later in
most cases. In order to facilitate signal to noise ratio
(SN R) definition later in Section IV, it is assumed that
E[U] = E[V] = 0, and E[|U|2] = E[|V|2] = 1. Alice
and Bob do not need to know or store the values of U
and V. The detected signal Wb at the RDA element can
be expressed as
Wb = q1/21b (H1U + G1V) + N1b, (6)
where Hx (Gx ) represents the channel coefficient
between Alice (Bob) and the RDA element at frequency
fx (x = 1, 2, 3), see Fig. 2. Nxy (y = a, b) is the
frequency representation of the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) nxy ∼ C N(0, σ 2n ), and all are indepen-
dent. q1/2xy is a scaling coefficient involving both the
amplification factor at transmitter sides and propagation
path loss, and it is used to set required SN R at receiver
sides. Here the E
[ |H1U + G1V|2
]
is normalized to
be unity. The RDA cannot separate the two signals
transmitted by Alice and Bob because both signals are
at the same frequency, and are occurring at the same
time, and none of H1, G1, U, and V are known.
At the same time Alice transmits a publicly known
training sequence X at a different frequency f2 ( f2 =
f1). The received signal at the RDA element at fre-
quency f2 is q1/22b H2X + N2b. Here H2 is normalized
such that E
[|H2|2
] = 1, seen in Fig. 2. Then the W∗b
weighted q1/22b H2X+N2b is radiated by the RDA element
at frequency f3 ( f3 = f2, f3 = f1).
At the Bob the detected signal Sb at frequency f3 can
be written as
Sb = q1/23b G3W∗b
(
q1/22b H2X + N2b
)
+ N3b. (7)
Similarly G3 is normalized to be E[|G3|2] = 1.
Since X is publicly known to every node in the system,
Bob is able to obtain the waveform observation Kb,
which in the frequency domain for the purpose of secret
key extraction is shown in (8).
Kb = q1/23b q1/22b G3W∗bH2 + q1/23b G3W∗bN2b
/
X + N3b
/
X
(8)
TS2) In time slot 2, U and V transmitted by Alice and Bob
at frequency f1 are still present, which generates Wa at
the RDA node, seen in (9).
Wa = q1/21a (H1U + G1V) + N1a (9)
In this time slot Bob transmits the same known X at
frequency f3, which, after being weighted with W∗a , is
re-transmitted by the RDA at frequency f2. When the
known X is equalized, the waveform Ka shown in (10)
can be acquired by Alice.
Ka = q1/22a q1/23a H2W∗aG3 + q1/22a H2W∗aN3a
/
X + N2a
/
X
(10)
From the first term of the obtained Ka in (10) at Alice
node and the first term of the obtained Kb in (8) at
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Bob node, a common secret key can be generated and
shared. The noise terms, i.e., the last two terms in
both (8) and (10), reduce the correlation coefficients
between Ka and Kb, and hence limit the achievable
secret key rates of the proposed system. These aspects
are investigated in Section IV.
It is worth pointing out that even within one channel coher-
ence time period, i.e., H1, G1, H2, and G3 remain unchanged
(here channel reciprocity is assumed), the equivalent common
channel observation H2W∗{a,b}G3 still varies, and for different
key generation rounds they are uncorrelated. This is achieved
by randomly choosing Ui and V i , which are unknown to any
of the nodes in the system, in each key generation round.
In other words, many key generation rounds can be performed
within one channel coherence time period, leading to a greatly
increased KGR.
When compared with the conventional digital transceivers
used in previous relay key generation systems, the analogue
phase-locked-loop (PLL) phase conjugators [47] remove the
needs of analogue-to-digital converters, digital-to-analogue
converters, and digital processing units, and for appropriate
frequency chosen, down-conversion and up-conversion mod-
ules can also be eliminated. In this sense, the proposed RDA
relay system has lower cost. The system implementation is
under way with the PLL chipset ADF4360-1 chosen. The
experimental setup and measured results are planned to be
reported separately.
B. Eavesdropping Strategies
In this subsection, the effects of some eavesdropping strate-
gies that can be adopted by a malicious node, named as Eve,
are investigated.
Following the same assumptions in most physical layer key
generation schemes in wireless networks [13], [16], [35], we
assume that:
• Eve knows the key generation procedures described in
the previous subsection;
• Every nodes in the system, including Eve, know the
training sequence X. The case of X being obtained by
actual wireless transmission is investigated in Section V.
The above is actually the worst scenario with regard to the
secure wireless transmission.
In this paper, we investigate three worst-case eavesdropping
strategies:
a) Eve is able to obtain the ‘clean’ signals that are trans-
mitted by one of the legitimate nodes. Here the ‘clean’
simply means no multipath and no channel noise. In
this case the channel coefficient between one of the
legitimate nodes and Eve is set to 1;
b) It is assumed that Eve’s antenna is able to be placed
close enough to one of the legitimate nodes, which leads
to correlated legitimate and eavesdropping channels;
c) The combination of the cases a) and b), i.e., Eve is able
to obtain ‘clean’ signals transmitted by each legitimate
node and Eve is able to create correlated legitimate and
eavesdropping channels.
It is obvious to conclude that the strategy c) is equivalent to
the case of multiple Eves that are able to collude, which is
not commonly studied in previous key generation work.
We investigate the secret key rate RR D As [9], [53], expressed
in (11), for different eavesdropping strategies in our proposed
RDA key generation system. ‘I (·; ·)’ denotes mutual informa-
tion. Here we assume Eve attempts to estimate the generated
waveform Ka (Kb) at Alice (Bob) node. The estimation is
denoted as Ke. Only real parts of associated waveforms,
i.e., Re(Ka), Re(Kb), and Re(Ke), are considered in order
to facilitate comparison with previous related works [35].
RR D As =
[
I
(
Re (Ka) ; Re (Kb)
)
−
min
(
I
(
Re (Ka) ; Re (Ke)
)
, I
(
Re (Kb) ; Re (Ke)
))]+
(11)
a) Eve observes one of the legitimate nodes.
• Eve intercepts the signals radiated by Alice.
Alice radiates signals at frequencies f1 and f2.
If Eve has ability to intercept at both frequencies,
she can obtain U and the publicly known X.
• Eve intercepts the signals radiated by Bob.
Bob radiates signals at frequencies f1 and f3. If Eve
has ability to intercept at both frequencies, she can
obtain V and the publicly known X.
• Eve intercepts the signals radiated by the RDA.
In TS1 RDA radiates signals at frequency f3. The
noiseless observation, after X being divided, is
KTS1e = q1/23b q1/22b W∗bH2 + q1/23b W∗bN2b
/
X. (12)
Similarly, in TS2 RDA radiates signals at fre-
quency f2. The noiseless observation, after X being
divided, is
KTS2e = q1/22a q1/23a W∗aG3 + q1/22a W∗aN3a
/
X. (13)
When comparing KTS{1,2}e and K{a,b}, it can be
concluded that Eve has three choices to estimate
legitimate waveforms. They are KTS1e , KTS2e , and
KTS1e KTS2e .
It is obvious that Eve can acquire more information
for better estimation of the K{a,b} through observing
the signals transmitted by the RDA, compared with
the amount of information obtained through intercepting
Alice (Bob)’s signal radiation.
b) Eve’s antenna is placed close enough to one of the
legitimate nodes.
• Eve’s antenna is placed close to Alice.
In this case the eavesdropping channel between Eve
and the RDA is correlated to the legitimate channel
between Alice and the RDA. Since the RDA radiates
signals at frequencies f2 and f3 in two different time
slots, two pairs of correlating channels are created.
One pair of correlating channels at frequency f3
are denoted as P3 and H3, respectively, for eaves-
dropping and legitimate channels. However, since
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the legitimate channel H3 is not utilized in key
generation process, see (8) and (10), this channel
pair does not help Eve in terms of interception.
The other eavesdropping channel at frequency f2,
denoted as P2, is correlated to H2 through the
correlation coefficient ρR D Aae expressed in (14).
ρR D Aae =
E
(
Re(P2)Re(H2)
)
√
E
[(
Re(P2)
)2] E
[(
Re(H2)
)2]
(14)
Eve cannot estimate P2, and hence H2, since
q1/22a q
1/2
3a W∗aG3X+q1/22a W∗aN3a radiated by the RDA
in TS2 is unknown to any nodes in the system.
Fortunately, from Eve’s point of view, she does not
need to know H2. It is better for her to estimate Ka
as a whole directly. The obtained waveform, Kaee ,
used for estimation can be written as
Kaee = q1/22a q1/23a P2W∗aG3 + q1/22a P2W∗aN3a
/
X
+Nae2e
/
X, (15)
where channel noise Nae2e at the Eve node is assumed
to have the same distribution as N2a .
• Eve’s antenna is placed close to Bob.
Similar to the case discussed above, an eavesdrop-
ping channel, denoted as Q3, is created at frequency
f3, and it is correlated to the legitimate channel
G3 with a correlation coefficient ρR D Abe . ρR D Abe is
expressed the same as ρR D Aae in (14) with P2 and
H2 being replaced with Q3 and G3, respectively.
The corresponding waveforms, Kbee , used for esti-
mation at Eve node can be expressed in
Kbee = q1/23b q1/22b Q3W∗bH2 + q1/23b Q3W∗bN2b
/
X
+Nbe3e
/
X, (16)
where channel noise Nbe3e at the Eve node is assumed
to have the same distribution as N3b.
• Eve’s antenna is placed close to the RDA.
In this case Eve is able to obtain an estimation of H2
and G3, since Alice and Bob project X at frequency
f2 and f3, respectively. It is noted that although
Alice and Bob transmit U and V at frequency f1,
the corresponding channels, H1 and G1, cannot be
estimated by Eve. This is because U and V are
transmitted at the same frequency at the same time
and they are unknown to any of the nodes in the
system. The leakage of parts of H2 and G3 helps
little to Eve in terms of interception, compared with
the strategies of placing the antenna close to Alice
or Bob discussed above.
c) Multiple Eves that are able to collude.
It is obvious that this case of multiple colluding Eves
includes the scenarios a) and b) discussed above.
As a consequence, the secrecy performance in this case
is upper bounded by those obtained under the scenarios
a) and b). In this subsection, we investigate a straight-
forward strategy that can be adopted by colluding
Eves, i.e., collaboratively estimate each factor within
q1/22{b,a}q
1/2
3{b,a}H2W∗{b,a}G3, which are the first items in
K{b,a}, respectively, and which are used for common
secret key extraction. In order to simplify discussion,
only the eavesdropping of q1/22b q
1/2
3b H2W
∗
bG3 in TS1 is
studied. The case of eavesdropping of q1/22a q
1/2
3a H2W
∗
aG3
in TS2 can be formulated similarly.
The three factors within q1/22b q
1/2
3b H2W
∗
bG3 can be esti-
mated as follows,
• Estimation of q1/22b H2.
There are two ways of estimating H2. Eve can place
her antenna either close to Alice or close to the
RDA, creating a pair of correlating channels P2
and H2 or J2 and H2. J2 is the channel coefficient
between Alice and the Eve that is close to the RDA.
Since in the key generation process Alice transmits
publicly known X at f2 in TS1, while the RDA
transmits noisy unknown W∗aG3 at f2 in TS2, it
is obvious that placing Eve’s antenna close to the
RDA, i.e., estimating H2 via the calculation of J2,
is the better strategy that Eve should adopt. The
correlation coefficient between J2 and H2 is denoted
as ρR D Ae2 . In this case the estimation of q
1/2
2b H2 can
be expressed as
q1/22b Hˆ2 = q1/22b J2 + Nre2e/X, (17)
where the noise Nre2e is assumed to have the same
distribution as N2b.
• Estimation of q1/23b G3.
Similarly the best estimation can be obtained in TS2
by an Eve whose antenna is placed close to the
RDA. In this case a pair of correlating channels J3
and G3 with correlation coefficient ρR D Ae3 is created.
J3 is the channel coefficient between Bob and the
Eve that is close to the RDA. The estimation of of
q1/23b G3 can be formulated as
q1/23b Gˆ3 = q1/23b J3 + Nre3e/X, (18)
where the noise Nre3e is assumed to have the same
distribution as N3a .
• Estimation of Wb.
Wb is shown in (6). U and V can be observed
directly because under this colluding eavesdropping
strategy we assume that Eve can obtain noiseless
copies of signals transmitted by every legitimate
nodes. However, Eve cannot separately estimate H1
and G1 since H1U and G1V are radiated at the same
frequency f1 and are occurring at the same time. As
a consequence, Eve can only obtain the estimated
Wb via
Wˆb = q1/21b
(
J H1U + JG1V
)
+ N1e, (19)
where the noise term N1e is assumed to have the
same distribution as N1b in (6). J H1 (JG1) is the
channel coefficient at the frequency f1 between
Alice (Bob) and the Eve whose antenna is placed
close to the RDA.
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With the colluding capability, multiple Eves are able to
use (17), (18), and (19) to construct estimated Kcole ,
Kcole = q1/23b q1/22b Gˆ3Wˆ
∗
bHˆ2
= q1/23b q1/22b J3Wˆ
∗
bJ2 + q1/23b J3Wˆ
∗
bNre2e/X
+q1/22b J2Wˆ
∗
bNre3e/X + Wˆ
∗
bNre2eN
re
3e/X
2. (20)
When comparing (20) with (16), it can be seen that Kcole
contains less information about the genuine waveform,
i.e., I
(
J3Wˆ
∗
bJ2; G3W∗bH2
)
< I
(Q3W∗bH2; G3W∗bH2
)
.
Here J3 and Q3 defined early in this section are not
the same, but they are equivalent. While the three noise
terms in (20) are greater than the two noise terms in
(16). As a consequence, we can conclude that separately
estimating each factors within the waveforms shared
among legitimate nodes by colluding Eves does not help
eavesdropping when compared with the case b).
From the above discussions in this subsection, it can be
concluded that the best strategies that Eve can adopt are
directly intercepting signals radiated by the RDA, or placing
Eve’s antenna close enough to Alice or Bob in order to create
correlated channel pairs, i.e., P2 and H2, and Q3 and G3, to
estimate Ka or Kb directly, see illustrations in Fig. 2.
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section the secrecy performance of the proposed
RDA assisted key generation system is evaluated, and com-
pared with non-relay and previous relay systems.
The non-relay system, acting as a bench mark, comprises
only Alice and Bob, between which the reciprocal Rayleigh
channel is denoted as Hnr . The previous relay key genera-
tion systems used for comparison are schemes described in
[35]. Apart from the secret key rates expressed in (11), the
correlation coefficients between obtained waveforms at Alice
and Bob used for secret key extraction in different systems
are also simulated and provided since these parameters are
useful for practical system design. For example, quantization
levels and signal pre-processing algorithms are determined by
the correlation coefficients between waveform observations at
Alice and Bob. The operation frequencies of the RDA for
all the results presented in this section are configured to be
f3 − f1 =  f = 2 MHz and f2 − f1 =  f /2 = 1 MHz.
A. Comparison With Non-Relay Key Generation System
In the non-relay key generation system, the waveforms
acquired at Alice and Bob can be expressed as in (21) and
(22), respectively.
Knra = q1/2nr Hnr + Nnra (21)
Knrb = q1/2nr Hnr + Nnrb (22)
The noise terms Nnra and Nnrb are independent and follow
C N
(
0, σ 2nr
)
. The scaling factor q1/2nr is utilized to set the
required SN Rnr .
SN Rnr = qnr
σ 2nr
(23)
Fig. 3. Calculated correlation coefficients between observed waveforms at
Alice and Bob used for secret key extraction in non-relay and proposed RDA
assisted key generation systems.
In Fig. 3 the correlation coefficient ρnrKaKb , which is calcu-
lated by replacing P2 and H2 with Knra and Knrb , respectively,
in (14), is depicted as a function of SN R. Here SN R equals
SN Rnr in (23). In simulations conducted in this paper the key
generation round is repeated 4 × 106.
When bringing the proposed RDA assisted key generation
system under consideration, the system SN R needs to be
defined separately since more wireless communication links
exist in the system. Only signal transmissions in TS1 are
investigated. SN Rs in TS2 can be defined in a similar way.
• The SN R of the received signals q1/21b (H1U + G1V),
seen in (6), at the RDA node at frequency f1 is denoted
as SN RR D A1 ,
SN RR D A1 =
q1b
σ 2n
. (24)
It is assumed that q1a = q1b.
• The SN R of the received signals q1/22b H2X at the RDA
node at frequency f2 is denoted as SN RR D A2 ,
SN RR D A2 =
q2b
σ 2n
. (25)
It is assumed that q2a = q2b.
• The power ratio of the received signal
q1/21b q
1/2
2b q
1/2
3b H2(H1U + G1V)∗G3X at Bob at frequencyf3 with respect to the noise power of N3b is denoted as
SN RR D A3 ,
SN RR D A3 =
q1bq2bq3b
σ 2n
(26)
It is assumed that q3a = q3b.
Here it needs to be pointed out that the SN RR D A3 is
greater than the SN R within the waveform Kb in (8) in
terms of secret key extraction, since the noise introduced
at frequencies f1 and f2, i.e., N1b and N2b, are not
involved in the definition of SN RR D A3 .
The correlation coefficients ρR D AKaKb between the observed Ka
and Kb in the proposed RDA assisted key generation systems
are calculated for various SN RR D Ax (x = 1, 2, 3) scenarios,
and are also depicted in Fig. 3. As expected, along with more
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Fig. 4. Calculated secret key rates (a) Rnrs (b) R RD As (c) Rrs (d) Rr_cols in (a) non-relay (b) RDA assisted (c)(d) SC-AF and MA-AF key generation systems
as functions of (a) S N Rnr (b) S N R RD A (c) S N Rr (d) S N Rr_col when Eve’s (Eves’) antenna(s) is (are) placed close to Alice or (and) Bob.
key generation procedures, more noise is introduced into the
waveforms shared between Alice and Bob, leading to reduced
key correlation coefficients compared with that in the non-
relay key generation system. However, a) as can be seen in
Fig. 3, the performance degradation can be traded by config-
uring SN RR D Ax through different key generation procedures;
b) multiple key generation rounds can be conducted within a
single channel coherence time period, since Ui and V i can
be randomly generated, leading to a greatly enhanced KGR.
In order to facilitate discussion only the case of SN RR D A{1,2,3} =
SN RR D A is investigated in the rest of the simulations in this
paper.
The secret key rates in the non-relay key generation system,
Rnrs , when considering Eve’s antenna being placed close to
Alice or Bob, can be calculated using (11) by replacing
K{a,b,e} with their corresponding Knr{a,b,e}. K
nr
e is the waveform
obtained at Eve node used for secret key estimation in the non-
relay key generation system. The term I
(
Re(Knra ); Re(Knrb )
)
can be computed directly with the closed-form formula
in (27), [54].
I
(
Re(Knra ); Re(Knrb )
)
= −1
2
log
(
1 − (ρnrKaKb
)2) (27)
By obtaining correlation coefficients ρnrK{a,b}Ke between
Knr{a,b} and Knre for different SN Rnr , the term
I
(
Re(Knr{a,b}); Re(Knre )
)
can be computed similarly as
in (27).
The calculated secret key rates Rnrs in the non-relay key
generation systems with different ρnr{a,b}e are depicted as a
function of SN Rnr in Fig. 4(a). ρnr{a,b}e is the correlation
coefficient between Hnr and the eavesdropping channels. Thus
it is different to ρnrK{a,b}Ke , which can be computed from ρ
nr
{a,b}e
by using (28). The ‘channel use’ in Fig. 4 means a single key
generation round.
ρnrK{a,b}Ke =
SN Rnr
SN Rnr + 1ρ
nr
{a,b}e (28)
It should be noted that the closed-form formula in (27) is
only applicable when the statistical distributions of observed
waveforms are Gaussian, which does not necessarily hold in
most other key generation systems, including the previous
relay and our proposed RDA assisted key generation sys-
tems. Thus the results estimated using a mutual informa-
tion calculation method that is based on k-nearest neighbor
(knn) distances [55] are also presented and are shown good
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agreement with the closed-form results, seen in Fig. 4(a). For
system simulation results presented later in this paper, this knn
distances method is adopted.
The secret key rates RR D As in the proposed RDA assisted
key generation systems are also calculated and shown
in Fig. 4(b) for the same eavesdropping scenarios, i.e., Eve’s
antenna is placed close to Alice or Bob. Different from the
non-relay case shown in Fig. 4(a), the RDA assisted key
generation system is more susceptible in this eavesdropping
scenario. It is also noticed that even when ρR D A{a,b}e = 0, there is
still an amount of information about the observed waveforms
at the legitimate nodes leaked (The curve for ρR D A{a,b}e = 0 is
below the curve for the upper bound I (Ka; Kb) ). This is due
to the fact that the legitimate waveforms and intercepted wave-
forms take forms of H2W∗{a,b}G3 and P2W∗aG3 (or H2W∗bQ3).
They are not independent even if H2 (G3) and P2 (Q3) are
independent.
In Section VI, we will show that when equipping multiple
antennas at the RDA node, the wireless transmission gains
from the RDA towards the legitimate nodes, Alice or Bob,
can be greater than those gains towards Eve, increasing RR D As
under the same ρR D A{a,b}e scenarios.
B. Comparison With Previous Relay Key Generation
Systems in [35]
There have been a number of key generation meth-
ods reported, such as multi-antenna [24], multi-carrier [28],
random beamforming [31], and relay based schemes [35]. The
proposed RDA assisted key generation scheme in this paper
is not a replacement of the multi-antenna, multi-carrier, and
random beamforming schemes. In fact all of these techniques
can be combined to lead to a further enhanced KGR. The
combination can be straight-forward. Thus in our view it is
not meaningful to compare the proposed RDA key generation
system with these three types of schemes. However, since
the proposed RDA key generation system is a relay-based
scheme, the comparison with previous relay key generation
systems is necessary, in order to claim the better performance
that can be achieved in the proposed RDA key generation
system. There have been several relay key generation systems
reported, such as [17] and [33]–[37]. Among all previous
reported relay key generation systems, we reckon that [35]
investigated the most general relay key generation schemes,
which, as a consequence, is selected to compare with the
proposed RDA key generation system in this paper.
In [35] four relay key generation schemes were pre-
sented, which are classified by the authors as amplify-
and-forward (AF), signal-combining amplify-and-forward
(SC-AF), multiple-access amplify-and-forward (MA-AF), and
amplify-and-forward with artificial noise (AF-AN). The AF
scheme, as the authors pointed out, is not secure when the
relay is monitored by Eve. The AF-AN scheme relies on the
design of the artificial noise that is projected by the relay
node towards Eve, but not Alice and Bob. For the architecture
proposed in this paper, the generation of artificial noise using
RDA for the benefit of wireless key generations will be
presented separately in the future. Compared with the SC-AF,
Fig. 5. Calculated correlation coefficients between observed waveforms at
Alice and Bob used for secret key extraction in SC-AF, MA-AF, and proposed
RDA assisted key generation systems.
the MA-AF reduces the number of required time slots for a
single key generation round from four to three at the cost of
requirement for synchronization between Alice and Bob. The
secret key rates in the SC-AF and MA-AF systems are almost
identical when the unit ‘bit/channel use’ is adopted. They are
both denoted as Rrs in this paper.
In order to facilitate discussion in this paper, the waveforms
acquired at Alice and Bob used for key generation purpose in
the SC-AF scheme are presented in (29) and (30).
Kra =
1√
2
[
q1/2r1 (H
r + Gr ) + Nra2 + Nrb2
]
Hr + Nra3
−
(
q1/4r1 H
r + N
r
a1
q1/4r1
)2
(29)
Krb =
1√
2
[
q1/2r1 (H
r + Gr ) + Nra2 + Nrb2
]
Gr + Nrb3
−
(
q1/4r1 G
r + N
r
b1
q1/4r1
)2
(30)
Hr (Gr ) refers to the Rayleigh wireless channel between Alice
(Bob) and the relay. They are independent, and are normalized
to be E
[ |Hr |2 ] = E[ |Gr |2 ] = 1. It is assumed that all
of the noise terms Nr{a,b}{1,2,3} are independent and follow
C N(0, σ 2r ). The SN Rs of signal transmissions in each step
in the SC-AF key generation process are set to be identical,
denoted as SN Rr = qr1/σ 2r .
In Fig. 5 the calculated correlation coefficients ρrKa Kb
between Kra and Krb in SC-AF and MA-AF schemes are
presented and compared with its counterpart in the RDA
assisted key generation systems. Clearly, it can be concluded
that more noise involved in the SC-AF (MA-AF) key gen-
eration systems, seen in (29) and (30), reduces the achieved
ρrKa Kb significantly, when the channel SN Rs are identical. The
reduced ρrKaKb results in lower secret key rates R
r
s that are
depicted in Fig. 4(c). The Rrs is defined the same as RR D As
in (11) with K{a,b,e} being replaced with their counterparts
Kr{a,b,e}. Here Kre, used for Rrs calculation in Fig. 4(c), is
the detected waveform by Eve which is placed close to Alice
DING et al.: RETRODIRECTIVE-ASSISTED SECURE WIRELESS KEY ESTABLISHMENT 329
Fig. 6. Calculated secret key rates R RD As and Rrs in RDA and SC-AF
(MA-AF) key generation systems as functions of S N R when Eve monitors
the relay node.
or Bob. In this case, a pair of legitimate and eavesdropping
channels with correlation coefficient ρr{a,b}e is created. The
noise terms
(
q1/4r1 {Hr , Gr } + Nr{a,b}1
/
q1/4r1
)2
in (29) and (30),
on the other hand, reduce the amount of leaked information
when Eve’s antenna is placed close to Alice or Bob.
When Eve has the capability to intercept signals radiated
by the relay node, the secret key rates, RR D As and Rrs are
obtained and compared in Fig. 6. During the calculation it is
found that in the RDA key generation system, using KTS1e KTS2e
as K{a,b} estimation at Eve node is always better than using
individual KTS{1,2}e . For Rrs calculation in the SC-AF and
MA-AF systems the waveforms used for secret key estimation
at Eve node are designed as
Kre = 12
[
q1/2r1 (H
r + Gr ) + Nra2 + Nrb2
]2
, (31)
as adopted in [35].
In order to facilitate comparison with the proposed RDA
key generation scheme, the same eavesdropping strategy of
colluding Eves for SC-AF and MA-AF is now investigated,
which were not studied in [35]. From (29) and (30) it can be
seen that the common waveform that is used for key extraction
at Alice and Bob nodes is 1√
2
q1/2r1 H
r Gr . Hence, with the
colluding capability different Eves can separately estimate Hr
and Gr , respectively, and then combine them to construct
Kr_cole , see (32), (33), and (34).
Kr_cole =
1√
2
q1/2r1 Hˆ
r Gˆr (32)
q1/2r1 Hˆ
r = q1/2r1 Pr + Nre1 (33)
q1/2r1 Gˆ
r = q1/2r1 Qr + Nre2 (34)
Here two pairs of correlating channels Hr (or Gr ) and
Pr (or Qr ) with correlation coefficient ρrHP (ρrGQ) are created.
Pr (Qr ) is the channel coefficient between the relay and the
Eve whose antenna is placed close to Alice (Bob) in time
slot 1 in both SC-AF and MA-AF schemes, see [35, Fig. 2].
The noise terms Nre{1,2} are independent, and are assumed
to follow the same distribution as Nr{a,b}1, i.e., Nre{1,2} ∼
C N(0, σ 2r ). Similarly, SN Rr_col is defined as qr1/σ 2r .
In Fig. 4(d) the calculated system secret rates Rr_cols are
presented for various ρr_col , here ρr_col = ρrHP = ρrGQ.
Compared with those in Fig.4(c), it can be seen that only
when the legitimate channels and eavesdropping channels are
highly correlated, collaboratively estimating each factor within
the shared waveforms between Alice and Bob in SC-AF
(MA-AF) scheme helps interception of secret keys.
From Figs. 4(b), 4(c), 4(d), and 6 it can be concluded
that the proposed RDA assisted key generation system outper-
forms, with regard to secrecy performance, both the previous
SC-AF and MA-AF relay key generation systems in [35].
Table I summarizes the characteristics of the non-relay, the
SC-AF, the MA-AF, and the proposed RDA assisted wireless
key generation systems. From Fig. 4(b) it can seen that the
proposed RDA assisted wireless key generation system is
relatively sensitive to the eavesdropping when Eve’s antenna
is placed close to Alice or Bob. This vulnerability can be
alleviated by exploiting more antenna elements in the RDA
which is investigated in Section VI.
V. IMPACT OF IMPERFECT TRAINING SEQUENCE ON
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
When the training sequence X is not perfectly shared among
all nodes in advance, it has to be distributed via actual wireless
transmissions during the key generation process. In this section
the impact of this wireless distributed and recovered X on the
system performance is investigated.
In TS1 Alice transmits training X at frequency f2, which
can be detected by Bob as
Xˆb = q1/22b HabX + Nab2b, (35)
where Hab is the wireless channel between Alice and Bob
at frequency f2, and Nab2b is the independent AWGN ∼
C N(0, σ 2b ). In the meantime, when the Eve antenna is placed
close to Bob, an estimation of X can be obtained by Eve as
Xˆe = q1/22b HaeX + Nae2e . (36)
Here Hae and Nae2e are defined the same as Hab and N
ab
2b , but
they are associated with Eve instead. Nae2e ∼ C N(0, σ 2e ), and
it is assumed that σe = σb.
Similarly in TS2, Bob transmits training Z at frequency f3,
which can be recovered at Alice and Eve positioned close to
Alice, respectively. The training sequence Z used by Bob is
different to the X used by Alice. The estimations of Z at Alice
and Eve nodes are denoted in
Zˆa = q1/23a GbaZ + Nba3a, (37)
and
Zˆe = q1/23a GbeZ + Nbe3e. (38)
Gba (or Gbe) is the wireless channel coefficient between Bob
and Alice (or Eve positioned close to Alice) at frequency f3.
The noise terms Nba3a and N
be
3e are assumed to have the same
distribution with Nab2b and N
ae
2e .
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-RELAY, SC-AF, MA-AF, AND PROPOSED RDA ASSISTED KEY GENERATION SYSTEMS
Since it is assumed that Eve is placed either close to Bob
in TS1 or close to Alice in TS2, it is reasonable to set the
magnitudes of legitimate and eavesdropping channel pair to
be identical, i.e., E
(|Hab|2
) = E (|Hae|2
)
and E
(|Gba|2
) =
E
(|Gbe|2
)
. Under these conditions, the SN Rs in the training
stage can be defined in (39) and (40).
SN Rt1 = q2b E
(|Ha{b,e}|2
)
σ 2{b,e}
(39)
SN Rt2 = q3a E
(|Gb{a,e}|2
)
σ 2{b,e}
(40)
With the imperfectly recovered training sequences, the
waveform observations obtained by Bob and Alice for secret
key extractions in (8) and (10), respectively, are thus contam-
inated, and they are expressed in (41) and (42).
Kb ′ = 1
k1Xˆb
(
q1/23b q
1/2
2b G3W
∗
bH2X + q1/23b G3W∗bN2b + N3b
)
(41)
Ka ′ = 1
k2Zˆa
(
q1/22a q
1/2
3a H2W
∗
aG3Z + q1/22a H2W∗aN3a + N2a
)
(42)
Similarly the intercepted waveforms by Eves that are placed
close to Bob or Alice can be written as
Kbee
′ = 1
k1Xˆe
(
q1/23b q
1/2
2b Q3W∗bH2X + q1/23b Q3W∗bN2b + Nbe3e
)
,
(43)
and
Kaee
′ = 1
k2Zˆe
(
q1/22a q
1/2
3a P2W
∗
aG3Z + q1/22a P2W∗aN3a + Nae2e
)
.
(44)
The coefficients k1 and k2 are added for power normalization
and they equal to q2b
√
E
(|Ha{b,e}|2
)
and q3a
√
E
(|Gb{a,e}|2
)
,
respectively.
Using (41), (42), (43), and (44), the secret key rates in the
proposed RDA assisted key generation system were calculated
Fig. 7. Calculated secret key rates R RD As in the proposed RDA assisted key
generation systems as functions of S N R RD A and S N Rt when Eve’s antenna
is placed close to Alice or Bob. ρRD A{a,b}e = 0.5 and S N Rt = S N Rt1 = S N Rt2.
for the case when Eve’s antenna is placed close to Alice or
Bob (ρR D A{a,b}e = 0.5) and imperfect training sequence recovery
is assumed. The results are illustrated in Fig. 7. As can be
expected, the higher quality of the wireless channel for training
sequence transmission, i.e., higher SN Rt1 and SN Rt2, makes
the secrecy performance of the system converge to that of
the system with perfectly shared training sequence. It is also
worth mentioning that an SN Rt of only 15 dB is sufficient to
maintain the performance advantage over that can be achieved
in the previous relay key generation systems even with the
assumption of perfect training sequence recovery, see Fig. 4(c)
for comparison.
VI. MULTI-ANTENNA RDA ASSISTED KEY GENERATION
In this section the benefit of using multiple RDA antenna
elements in the proposed key generation architecture is inves-
tigated. We do not exploit multiple wireless propagation
channels between Alice (or Bob) and each antenna in the
RDA to extract more secret keys in one key generation round.
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This is because in order to separate multiple propagation
channels more time slots are required and the RDA has to
know time slot assignment. And more importantly, when using
‘bit/time slot’ as the unit the achievable secret key rates do
not increase with the number M of the antenna elements in
the RDA. Instead we investigate the beamforming gains that
multiple RDA antenna elements can bring for the improvement
of the system secrecy performance under the scenario that
Eve’s antenna is placed close to Alice or Bob.
The response of a multipath wireless channel is a function
of both frequency and time. As we discussed in Section II,
when compared with the channel coherence time Tc in a
typical in-door multipath environment which is normally in
the order of tens to hundreds of ms, the RDA operation,
i.e., signal reception, phase conjugation, and re-transmission,
occurs within hundreds of μs, and thus it can be regarded as
‘real-time’, i.e., the channel response is constant with respect
to time during RDA operation. As a consequence only the
frequency configuration of an RDA is investigated. In order to
enable RDA phase conjugation operation a pilot signal, e.g.,
U and V used in the proposed scheme, normally needs to
be constantly present. For the purpose of increasing isolation
between the received pilot signal and the re-transmitted signal,
frequency-division duplexing for signal reception and signal
re-transmission is commonly adopted [38], [46].
In the proposed key generation architecture in this paper,
the RDA node receives the pilot signals at frequency f1 and
re-transmits signals at frequency f3 in TS1 and at frequency
f2 in TS2. As we discussed in Section II.B in a multipath
environment when the phase conjugation frequency is different
from the signal re-transmission frequency, (5) does not hold.
This means re-transmitted common signals by each RDA
antenna cannot be combined in-phase at the location where
the pilot signal is originated, resulting in reduced beamforming
gains, compared with ideal beamforming gains. In following
discussions only the transmission from the RDA to Bob in
TS1 is considered. In this case the relative beamforming gain
Gb in dB, experienced at Bob node, is defined as
Gb = 10 log10
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
E
(∣∣∣ H2 ◦
( H1U + G1V
)∗ · G3
∣∣∣
2)
E
(∣∣∣ H2 ◦
( H1U + G1V
)∗ · G1
∣∣∣
2)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
(45)
Here the ideal beamforming gain corresponds to the link
gain between the RDA and Bob when the frequencies for
pilot reception and signal re-transmission are identical, i.e.,
f1 = f3, so that G3 becomes G1. All of the vectors in (45)
have M elements with the mth entry representing the channel
coefficients between Alice or Bob and the mth RDA antenna
element at the corresponding frequencies.
In order to facilitate discussion in this section it is
assumed that the signal magnitudes radiated by each RDA
antenna element are identical and channels between each
RDA antenna and Bob are independent Rayleigh fading. The
amount of the loss of beamforming gains is determined by
the level of similarity between the channel involved in phase
Fig. 8. Simulated relative RDA re-transmission gains Gb for various στ ,
 f , and M.
conjugation process, i.e., G1, and the channel used for signal
re-transmissions, i.e., G3. The level of similarity, quantified
as channel correlation coefficients r f b, is a function of their
frequency separation  f = f3 − f1 and channel frequency
characteristics described with parameter στ . r f b is calculated
using (3) with H( f, t) and H( f + f, t +t) being replaced
with G1 and G3, respectively.
In Fig. 8 the simulated relative RDA re-transmission beam-
forming gains, Gb are illustrated for a range of frequency
separations  f , and also for different numbers M of RDA
antenna elements. Multipath channels with στ of 20 ns, 50 ns,
and 100 ns are considered. Values of delay spread other than
20 ns, 50 ns, and 100 ns can be equivalently adopted. The
results shown in Fig. 8 are averaged over 2000 time instants
that are separated far beyond the channel coherence time Tc.
As expected for a fixed RDA element M , greater frequency
spacing  f and RMS delay spread στ lead to lower relative re-
transmission beamforming gain. This is because in these cases
the propagation channels G1 and G3, at signal reception and
re-transmission frequencies respectively, are less correlated.
Similarly, when the channel and frequency spacing are fixed,
i.e., στ and  f are fixed, greater numbers of RDA elements
result in lower relative RDA re-transmission beamforming
gain. This can be explained that more array antenna elements
generate radiation beam patterns with narrower main beams
which are more susceptible to the dissimilarity between the
wireless channels at frequencies f1 and f3, i.e., G1 and G3.
Since the channel correlation coefficient r f b between G1
and G3 is a function of both στ and  f , the curves in Fig. 8
can be simplified by plotting relative RDA beamforming gains
Gb against r f b, shown in Fig. 9. r f b = 1 means that either
the RDAs receive and re-transmit at the same frequency, i.e.
 f = 0, or the wireless channels are flat-fading, i.e., L = 1.
We deliberately write the axis units in Fig. 9 as r f and
G, instead of r f b and Gb. This is because the Fig. 9 can
also be applicable to r f e and Ge, when Eve’s antenna is
placed close to Bob. r f e is the channel correlation coefficient
between G1 and the eavesdropping channel Q3. It is noted thatG1 and G3 is correlated with coefficient r f b, and G3 and Q3
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Fig. 9. Simulated relative RDA re-transmission gains as functions of channel
correlation coefficients r f for different number M of RDA elements.
TABLE II
SIMULATED EXAMPLE OF r f {b,e} AND G{b,e} FOR DIFFERENT NUMBERS
M OF RDA ELEMENTS. (στ = 50 nS,  f = 2 MHZ, ρRD Abe = 0.5)
TABLE III
SIMULATED EXAMPLE OF r f {b,e} AND G{b,e} FOR DIFFERENT NUMBERS
M OF RDA ELEMENTS. (στ = 50 nS,  f = 2 MHZ, ρRD Abe = 0.2)
is correlated with coefficient ρR D Abe . Ge is defined similarly
as in (45) with G3 being replaced with Q3.
Two examples of achieved relative RDA beamforming
gains toward Bob and Eve, i.e., Gb and Ge, together
with associated r f b and r f e are provided in Table II and
Table III. The difference of Gb and Ge corresponds to
the difference of received SN Rs at Bob and Eve nodes
when the added channel noise N3b at Bob and Nbe3e at
Eve have the same distribution. It is this gain difference
Gb − Ge that determines the amount of improvement of
secrecy performance when multiple antennas at RDA node are
employed. For better illustration the gain differences Gb −
Ge are plotted for various στ ,  f , ρR D Abe , and M in Fig. 10.
As can be concluded, the smaller values of στ ,  f , and ρR D Abe ,
and the greater number M lead to larger gain differences
Gb − Ge. Intuitively, when στ and/or  f → ∞, the
frequencies of receive and re-transmission at RDA node are
Fig. 10. Gain differences Gb −Ge as a function of στ ,  f , ρRD Abe , and
M when EveâŁ™s antenna is placed close to Bob.
Fig. 11. Calculated secret key rates R RD As in 9-element RDA assisted
key generation systems as functions of S N R RD A when EveâŁ™s antenna
is placed close to Bob. (στ = 50 ns and  f = 2 MHz).
separated far beyond the coherence bandwidth, resulting in no
beamforming gain towards the legitimate keying nodes in the
multi-antenna RDA scenario. The gain differences, namely, the
differences of SN Rs at Bob and Eve nodes, make the proposed
RDA assisted key generation systems less vulnerable under the
eavesdropping strategy of placing Eve’s antenna close to Alice
or Bob, especially for small ρR D A{a,b}e. Fig. 11 gives an example
of the simulated RR D As for different ρR D Abe . In this example
it is assumed that στ = 50 ns,  f = 2 MHz, and M = 9.
Compared with RR D As shown in Fig. 4(b), it can be seen
that more RDA antenna elements help reduce the chance of
being intercepted by the Eve positioned around Alice or Bob.
In addition greater beamforming gains enabled by adopting
more RDA antennas reduce the transmitted power by the RDA
under the same system SN R requirement.
VII. CONCLUSION
A new type of wireless key generation system architec-
ture, using an RDA as a relay node, was proposed and
analyzed in this paper. By configuring analogue RDAs receive
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and re-transmit at different frequencies, the number of time
slots required for each key generation round was reduced to
two. Furthermore, the equivalent reciprocal wireless channels
between legitimate keying nodes can be controlled, by Alice
and Bob, to be ‘fast fading’, which is able to increase KGRs
significantly. Also distinct from the previous relay based key
generation systems, the RDAs employed do not need to have
additional digital computational capability, and do not need
to acquire knowledge about system parameters, such as time
slots assignment and training sequences, which makes this
architecture more flexible in terms of adding more legitimate
keying nodes and/or more RDA relay nodes. Through sim-
ulations it was shown that the proposed RDA assisted key
generation systems have better secrecy performance than that
in the previous relay key generation systems, under various
eavesdropping strategies.
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